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The Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) Special Report on Regulatory Reform
The COP report provides an excellent guide concerning lessons to be learned from the US financial crisis and is a lucid discussion of the following problems or shortcomings of the financial system: The excessive leverage and unregulated shadow financial system are sources of systemic risk. Many financial institutions carry a "dangerous" amount of leverage. Systemic risk is not identified or regulated until the crisis is imminent. The report contains several parts: Lessons from the past; Shortcomings of the present system; Leverage, Capital requirements; Current state of the regulatory system; Critical problems and recommendations for improvement.
There is a large descriptive literature on the financial crisis. I ignore the studies concerning the reform and regulation of financial markets. I focus upon and critique several representative key articles in the literature that concern the aims of the COP Report. These key articles reflect different approaches and contain relevant references.
The relevant linkages are that (i) asset prices, debt ratios/leverage affect the vulnerability of specific sectors, such as housing, to shocks, (ii) this vulnerability is transmitted to the larger financial sector through leverage and interrelationships, and (iii) the real economy is then affected. I state/paraphrase/quote and evaluate the key studies with the respect to the following questions. To what extent do the empirical relations in the existing literature help to identify asset price bubbles ex-ante or ex-post? Do the empirical studies have theoretical foundations?
On the basis of that critique, I explain why the application of stochastic optimal control (SOC)/dynamic risk management is a much more effective approach to determine the optimal degree of leverage, the optimum and excessive risk and the probability of a debt crisis. The theoretically founded early warning signals of a crisis are shown to be superior, in general, to those empirical relations in the literature. Moreover the SOC analysis provides a theoretical explanation of the extent that the empirical measures in the literature can be useful.
Background
Financial crises are not new. From 1792-1933, they occurred roughly every 15-20 years.
As the US emerged from the Great Depression, the new financial regulation -including FDIC, securities regulation and banking supervision -effectively protected the system.
For the next 50 years, economic growth returned without financial crises. There have always been voices predicting financial crises, but the economics profession ignored them because they lacked theoretical foundations and testable quantitative propositions.
These voices of financial disaster were like those who have been predicting earthquake disasters. See Seth Stein, "Disaster Deferred", chapter 2 for a discussion of alarmist earthquake predictions.
The period from 1933 to the 1980s was tranquil. The Savings and Loan Crisis of 1980s did not produce systemic risk. The situation changed in the 1980s and 1990s.
Deregulation and the growth of unregulated parallel markets were accompanied by the nearly unrestricted marketing of increasingly complex financial instruments. Alan Greenspan (2002) explained his view on the issue of regulation and disclosure in the over the counter derivatives market as follows.
"By design, this market, presumed to involve dealings among sophisticated professionals, has been largely exempt from government regulation. In part, this exemption reflects the view that professionals do not require the investor protections commonly afforded to markets in which retail investors participate. But regulation is not only unnecessary in these markets, it is potentially damaging, because regulation presupposes disclosure and forced disclosure of proprietary information can undercut innovations in financial markets just as it would in real estate markets". The financial crisis that began to take hold in 2007 has exposed significant weaknesses in the nation's financial architecture and in the regulatory system designed to ensure its safety, stability and performance. As asset prices deflated, so too did the theory that increasingly guided American financial regulation over the previous three decadesthat private markets and private financial institutions could largely be trusted to regulate themselves.
This philosophy characterized the economics profession. Krugman, in his influential article "How Did Economists get it So Wrong", argues the following. "Few economists saw our current crisis coming…More important was the profession's blindness to the very possibility of catastrophic failures in a market economy. During the golden years, financial economists came to believe…that stocks and other assets were always priced just right….Meanwhile macroeconomists were divided in their views. But the main division was between those who insisted that free-market economies never go astray and those who believed that economies may stray now and then but any major deviations from the path of prosperity could and would be corrected by the all-powerful 
Leveraging
It is now widely believed that "'excessive" leveraging, an "excessive" debt ratio, at key financial institutions helped convert the initial subprime turmoil in 2007 into a full blown financial crisis of 2008. Leverage is the ratio of debt L(t)/net worth X(t) , alternatively called the debt ratio, and denoted f(t) = L(t)/X(t) . Although leverage is a valuable financial tool, "excessive" leverage poses a significant risk to the financial system. For an institution that is highly leveraged, changes in asset values highly magnify changes in net worth. To maintain the same debt ratio when asset values fall either the institution must raise more capital or it must liquidate assets.
The relations are seen through equations (i) -(iii). In (i) net worth X(t) is equal to the value of assets A(t) less debt L(t). Equation (ii) is just a way of expressing the debt ratio. Equation (iii) relates the debt ratio f(t) = L(t)/X(t) to the ratio A(t)/X(t) of assets/net worth. Equation (iv) states that the percent change in net worth dX(t)/X(t) is equal to the leverage (1+f(t)) times dA(t)/A(t) the percent change in the value of assets.
(iii) A(t)/X(t) = 1 + f(t).
(iv) dX(t)/X(t) = (1+ f(t)) dA(t)/A(t).
The COP reported that, on the basis of recent estimates just prior to the crisis, investment banks and securities firms, hedge funds, depository institutions, and the government sponsored mortgage enterprises -primarily Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac -held assets worth $23 trillion on a base of $1.9 trillion in net worth, yielding an overall average leverage of A/X = 12. The leverage ratio varied widely as seen below.
Broker-dealers and hedge funds 27 Government sponsored enterprises 17 Commercial banks 9.8 Savings Banks 6.9 Average 12
Consider the average, where A(t) = $23 trillion, X(t) = $1.9 trillion, L(t) = $21.1 trillion, then leverage f = 11.1. From equation (iv), a 3% decline in asset values would reduce net worth by dX(t)/X(t) = (1+11.1)(0.03) = 36%. The loss of net worth is equal to (0.36)($1.9 trillion) = $0.69 trillion. To maintain the same leverage f = 11, the institutions must either raise capital to offset the decline in asset values dX = dA < 0, or it must sell off assets to reduce its debt by the same proportion dL(t)/L(t) = dX(t)/X(t), derived from equation (ii).
A 3% decline in asset value would require the sale of (0.03)(21.1 trillion ) = $630 billion in assets to repay the debt.
Both actions have adverse consequences for the economy. Firms in the financial sector, the financial intermediaries, are interrelated as debtors-creditors. Banks lend short term to hedge funds who invest in longer term assets and who may also buy credit default swaps. Firms that lost $690 billion in net worth would have difficulty in raising capital to restore net worth, without drastic declines in share prices. Similarly, the attempt by group G 1 to sell $630 billion in assets to repay loans will have serious repercussions in the financial markets. The prices of these assets will fall, and the leverage story repeats for other sectors. Institutions G j who hold these assets will find that the value of their portfolio has declined, reducing their net worth. In some cases, there are triggers. When the net worth of a Fund G j falls below a certain amount ("break the buck") the fund must dissolve and sell its assets. These may include AAA assets. In turn the sale of AAA assets affects group G k . Investors in this group thought they were holding very safe assets, but to their dismay they suffer capital losses. The conclusion is that in a highly interrelated system, "high leverage" can be very dangerous. What seems like a small shock in one market can affect via leverage the whole financial sector. The Fed seemed oblivious to this systemic risk phenomenon. term to the Hedge Funds. The Funds were set up not to hedge risk but to seek maximum return and they were not in fear of taking risk. Atlas would make its profits from the difference between the lending rate charged to the hedge funds and the cost of short term borrowing. The latter could be reduced to a minimum if Atlas received a AAA rating. This was remarkable goal since most global banks are rated no higher than AA.
Since the portfolio had a much longer maturity than the loans, a major risk to Atlas would be the variable short term borrowing rate. When the 30-day loan matured, Atlas would roll over the 30-day loan at the current rate. If there were difficulties in rolling over, Atlas would have to find banks to give Atlas "emergency" loans to pay off the 30-day debt. These standby banks are called "liquidity providers".
The "financial engineers" built a model to evaluate the risk, which they used to convince the rating agencies to give them the AAA rating. A higher rating lowers the cost of borrowing. The model would simulate the movement of the $12 billion of individual assets as well as their correlated behavior. These assets raged from bonds, loans, to more complicated structured securities backed by all kinds of collateral. The mismatch of the timing of cash flows of assets and liabilities, the price movements , the rating changes, the defaults and recovery had to be "accurately" modeled, calculated and simulated. what is the probability that housing prices will decline? Given the mean and standard deviation, there was only a 3% chance that prices would fall. 
Therefore no mortgage crisis was anticipated.
There was no economic theory or analysis in this approach. It was simply a VaR value at risk implication from a sample based upon relatively recent data. There was no consideration of what would happen if the probability distribution/histogram would change. More fundamentally, no consideration was given to the economic determinants of the probability distribution. This was the fatal error. Thus the procedure was to specify an equation for the "equilibrium" value of the asset based upon specific fundamentals" and then an equation for the adjustment of the actual asset price to the "equilibrium" value. In the case of housing, the basic statistic is the Fiserv Case-Shiller repeat purchase house price index P(t). Moody's Economy (2008) for example developed an econometric model of the housing market to identify the forces determining P(t) and evaluate to what extent it can be explained by "fundamentals" and to what degree they are the result of temporal factors. The dynamics are mean reversion to the level associated by the fundamentals. Several approaches are taken. In one, the dependent variable is the ratio of housing prices to household income. In another the dependent variable is the ratio of housing prices to apartment rents. The logic is that owning a house and renting an apartment are substitutes, though not perfect. In these approaches the hypothesis is that housing prices will be mean reverting.
Moody's model has two equations. One is that the equilibrium housing price P*(t)
is related to fundamentals Z(t), which can be household income, household wealth, age distribution and other variables. The second equation is actual change in price dP(t) equation, which contains serial correlation terms, a mean reversion term and other factors.
They used the estimates from these two equations to predict housing price changes. This approach is a significant advance from the VaR approach described in part 2 above.
One can get a feeling of the "overpricing" of houses or the housing bubble in the following way. I constructed a ratio PRICEINC of housing prices P(t) to disposable
income Y(t). This is almost identical to Shiller's Ratio of Median Houses Price to Median
Income.
The latter came from FRED data set of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
The housing price index was based upon the 4-quarter appreciation of US housing prices reported by the Office of Federal Enterprise Oversight, labeled CAPGAIN in the figure 2.
The housing price P(t) was derived from an equation P(t) = P(t-1)[1+ CAPGAIN], where the initial value P(1980q1) = 1. The ratio of housing price/disposable income PRICEINC = P(t)/Y(t). In figure 2, both variables are normalized, with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
It is seen that the ratio PRICEINC = P(t)/Y(t) was very stable, almost constant deviation of the price/income ratio from its long term mean would suggest that there was a housing price "bubble" and that housing prices were greatly overvalued. A housing crisis would be predicted, where the ratio P(t)/Y(t) would return to the long term mean, which is the zero line. They define a credit boom as a period where the ratio of credit/GDP deviates from its trend by a specific amount called the "credit gap" Similarly they define an asset price boom as a period in which real asset prices deviate from their trends by specified amounts. This is defined as the "asset price gap". The BIS study concludes that the best EWS is a combination of a credit gap of 4 percentage points and an asset gap of 40 percent.
The BIS study, like that of K-R is a search for empirical relations and neither is based upon an analytical structure. The key studies have limitations. As a rule, the housing price bubble was not predicted ex-ante. The most useful warning signal was the rapid rise in the ratio of housing prices/disposable income or the ratio of housing prices/rents. On a macro level, there were empirical studies of whether either credit growth or asset prices was "excessive". The criteria for "excessive" were arbitrary. There was no concept of optimality as a benchmark in measuring "excessive" asset growth or asset price. On either the macro or the micro level, there were no analytic foundations of whether the price ratio or the asset price growth deviated from "fundamentals" to justify alarm.
In section 2 above, I showed how the financial engineering approach by the "Quants", where price anticipations were based upon recent frequency distributions, led to a severe underestimation of risk. They assumed that the observed prices or price changes are samples from a distribution with a constant mean µ and finite variance σ 2 .
They used the central limit theorem that states that the sample mean approaches the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 /n as the sample size increases.
Therefore they could use the VaR value at risk to estimate probability of losses.
Their fatal error was to assume that the probability density function of prices or price changes is relatively constant and independent of the behavior of market participants. They viewed the distribution function of price changes like mortality tables, which are not affected by those who study them.
The "Quants" failed to show understanding of the economics underlying financial crises: what produced the price movements, how the market participants acted upon these price movements in a way that led to further price movements and what price movements are or are not sustainable. The financial engineering by the "Quants", for example of Atlas Fund, led one of the principals in retrospect to call the approach "idiotic".
The approach that I now discuss concerns my recent work, which applies the techniques of stochastic optimal control to derive an optimal debt ratio or leverage that "optimally" balances risk and expected return in a world where the future is unpredictable. I explain: What are the consequences of a debt ratio that deviates in either direction from the derived optimal ratio? Why did the observed leverage deviate form the optimal? What are early warning signals of a debt crisis? How can the more successful empirical studies be explained theoretically? The answers to these questions have significant implications for both internal monitoring by firms or for "regulation".
Regulation is the subject of a large literature, but it is not discussed in this paper. The mathematics will be the same in both cases. Let X 1 be the net worth of the mortgagors who have capital K and debt L 1 . Thus X 1 (t) = K(t) -L 1 (t). Let X 2 be the net worth of the financial intermediaries. Their net worth is X 2 (t) = L 1 (t) -L 2 (t), since their assets are the liabilities of the mortgagors. The net worth of the consolidated mortgagors and financial intermediaries is X(t) = X 1 (t) + X 2 (t) = K(t) -L 2 (t).
(
1) X(t) = K(t) -L(t).
The performance criterion that I have chosen is the maximization of W(T) the expectation E(.) of the logarithm of net worth at some later time T from the present, equation (2). This is a sensible and very risk averse objective criterion because, in the deterministic case, if net worth X(T) = 0, the value of W(T) is minus infinity.
(2) W(T) = max E ln X(T).
The stochastic optimal control problem is to select debt ratios f(t) = L(t)/X(t) during the period (0,T) that will maximize W(T) in equation (2). This ratio is precisely
the optimal leverage, and will vary over time. The solution of the stochastic optimal control/dynamic risk management problem tells us what is an optimal and what is an "excessive" leverage. Since W(T) is a positively sloped concave function, both expected return and risk are taken into account. Bankruptcy X = 0 is severely penalized. Low values of net worth close to zero may not be likely, but they have large negative utility weights. Hence the criterion function reflects strong risk aversion.
Dynamics of net worth
State variable net worth X(t) varies over time. The optimization of W(T) must be subject to how net worth varies. Whereas the choice of criterion function (1) is not controversial, there are several choices for the dynamic process of net worth. Each one has a different implication for the optimal leverage or debt ratio. Some assumed processes, such as discussed in part 2, led to bubbles and are unsustainable. This point will be discussed below in detail.
The dynamics of net worth start with equation (3). I focus upon the housing market as the example, but the analysis is quite general. The change in net worth is the change in capital dK(t) less the change in debt dL(t). Capital K(t), equal to the value of houses, is the product of the price P(t) of the asset (Housing price index) and the Q(t) the physical quantity. Hence K(t) = P(t)Q(t).
(3) dX(t) = dK(t) -dL(t).

The change in capital in equation (4) is the sum of two terms. The first P(t)dQ(t) is simply I(t) investment in housing. The second is the total capital gain or loss, equal to the product of the value of housing K(t) times the price change dP(t)/P(t). (4) dK(t) = d[P(t)Q(t)] = P(t)dQ(t) + Q(t)dP(t) = I(t) + K(t) dP(t)/P(t).
The change in the debt dL(t) equation (5) has two broad components. The first term i(t)L(t) is the interest payments on the existing debt, where i(t) is the interest rate.
The second set of terms is expenditures less income. Income is assumed to be derived from capital, as would be the case if the housing generated rents. This is equation (6),
where β(t) is the ratio of income Y(t) to K(t) capital. Expenditures are investment I(t) plus consumption C(t).
The debt grows when interest owed on the existing mortgages plus the excess of expenditure less income is positive. An example is that households borrowed and refinanced their mortgages to allow them to spend in excess of their income. Their anticipation was that, at some future date T, the value of the house exceeded their debt. If at date T, the value of capital K(T) exceed the debt L(T), the mortgagor had a "free lunch". If at date T the value of the house is less than the debt, the mortgagor has negative equity and faces foreclosure. 
5) dL(t) = [i(t)L(t) + I(t) + C(t) -Y(t)]dt (6) Y(t) = β(t) K(t).
The change in net worth dX(t) is equation (7).
A simplifying assumption is that consumption C(t) is proportional to X(t) net worth, where the proportion is the productivity of capital: C(t) = β(t)X(t).
Let f(t) = L(t)/X(t) be the leverage or debt ratio and k(t) = K(t)/X(t) = (1+f(t)) is
therefore the ratio of capital (assets) to net worth. That is why I referred to either f(t) or k(t) as leverage. Then the change in net worth can be written as equation (8), which is the basic equation for the dynamics of net worth.
(8) dX(t) = X(t){(1+f(t))dP(t)/P(t) + [β(t) -i(t)]f(t)dt}
The productivity of capital less the interest rate [β(t) -i(t)] is time varying and observable. The capital gain term dP(t)/P(t) is not observable since dP(t) involves the future.
Stochastic Processes
The basic stochastic variable in equation (8) is dP(t) the change in the housing price.
Equations (9) -(10) contain two ideas, inspired by Bielecki and Pliska and PlatenRebolledo, and discussed in Fleming (1999) .
The first, in equation (9)/(9a), is that there is a price trend ρ. The initial value of the price is P, which can be normalized at one. Variable y(t) in (9)/(9a) is a deviation from the trend. The second idea, expressed in equations (10)- (11), is that deviation y(t) is an ergodic mean reversion term whereby the price converges towards the trend. The speed of convergence of the deviation y(t) towards the trend is described by finite coefficient α > 0. Τhe stochastic term is σdw(t). The solution of stochastic differential equation (10) is (11). The deviation from trend converges to a distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of σ 2 /2α.
(9) P(t) = P exp (ρt + y(t)), P = 1, (9a) y(t) = ln P(t) -ln P -ρt.
(10) dy(t) = -αy(t)dt + σdw(t). ∞ > α > 0, E(dw) = 0, E(dw) 2 = dt.
(11) lim y(t) ~ N(0, σ 2 /2α).
The choice of price trend ρ is very important in determining the optimal leverage.
I impose a constraint that the assumed price trend must not exceed the rate of interest. If this constraint is violated, as occurred during the housing price bubble, debtors were offered a "free lunch" as described above. Borrow/Refinance the house and incur a debt that grows at the rate of interest. Spend the money in any way that one chooses. Insofar as the house appreciates at a rate greater than the rate of interest, at the terminal date T the house is worth more than the value of the loan, P(T) > L(T). The debt L(T) is easily repaid by selling the house at P(T) or refinancing. On has had a free lunch. In the optimization, one must constrain the trend ρ not to exceed the rate of interest i(t). This constraint is equation (12). That is why the rates of appreciation of 10 -14 % p.a. were unsustainable. This assumption was to have dire consequences, as discussed below.
Optimal debt ratio -leverage
The expected growth of net worth is equation (13), graphed as figure 3. It is a concave quadratic function of the control variable, the leverage or debt ratio f (t) = L(t)/X/(t). The debt ratio that maximizes the expected growth of net worth is f*(t), equation (16). This is the time varying ratio that maximizes equation (1) 
. Expected Growth of Net Worth W(f(t)) equation (13), and variance of growth of net worth, risk, equation (15). The optimum debt ratio f*(t)/ leverage, is equation (16).
As f(t) exceeds optimum f*(t), expected growth declines and risk rises. At f-max, the expected growth is zero.
The optimum debt ratio, leverage f*(t) in equation (16) is positively related to the productivity of capital β(t) less the real rate of interest r(t) = i(t) -ρ, equal to the nominal rate of interest i(t) less ρ the trend of prices. The "no free lunch" constraint is that the real rate of interest must be non-negative.
Expected Growth W(f(t)) and Risk
(13) W(f(t)) = E[d ln(X(t)] = [(1+f(t))(ρ + (1/2)σ 2 -αy(t)]+ (β(t) -i(t)) f(t) -(1/2)(1+f(t)) 2 σ 2 (14) r(t) = i(t) -ρ > 0. Real rate of interest constraint (15) var d[ln X(t)] = (1+f(t)) 2 σ 2 dt Risk
Optimal debt/net worth, leverage, f(t)= L(t)/X(t).
Corresponding to any debt ratio f(t) is an expected growth of net worth W(f(t)). The optimum leverage, debt ratio f*(t) maximizes the expected growth of net worth W[f*(t)] = W*(t). As the debt ratio deviates from the optimum, the expected growth of net worth declines.
One can never be certain of what is the correct trend ρ of prices, even with the constraint that it is not greater than the rate of interest. The positive value of the real rate of interest r(t) in (14) is unknown. Therefore the choice of an optimum leverage f*(t) at any time is subject to specification error.
Consider several cases. In one, the market anticipations of the price trend as described in part 2 is based upon the relatively recent experience of large capital gains. If leverage f1 is selected, the loss of the growth of net worth is W* -W1. The excess debt Ψ(t) = f(t) -f*(t) = f1 -f* is the difference between the actual debt f(t) = f1 and the optimal debt f*(t). The loss of expected growth is a quadratic function of the excess debt. This is equation (17).
The excess debt ratio [f1 -f*(t)] > 0 reduces expected growth from W* to W1 and increases risk. The distribution function of the expected growth shifts upwards and to the left. Insofar as there is an excess debt, the probability of losses of net worth increases.
Alternatively, suppose that there is government "regulation" to reduce risk and leverage f2 < f*(t) is imposed. Then the risk is indeed reduced, according to equation (15), the convex risk curve in figure 2. However, the expected growth is reduced to W1 < W*. The loss of expected growth is the same as before, but now the risk is lower.
Finally, suppose that one tries to estimate the trend with the constraint (14). There is bound to be an error h > 0, which leads to a leverage ratio between (f1= f* -h) < f*(t) < (f* + h = f2). The loss of expected growth does not average out because the income loss in (17) is in the square. As the leverage ratio ranges between f1 and f2, the average loss of growth worth is again W1 < W*. Equation (17) explicitly measures the loss of expected growth due to misspecification of the trend.
Summary
The contributions of the SOC analysis above can be summarized.
(1) The optimum debt ratio or leverages maximizes the expected growth of net worth.
(2) As the debt ratio rises above the optimum, the expected growth of net worth declines and the risk rises. (3) The probability of a crisis is positively related to the excess debt, equal to the difference between the actual and optimal debt ratio, measured in standard deviations. (4) An unambiguous early warning signal EWS of a debt crisis would be that the leverage f(t) = L(t)/X(t) exceeds f-max, so that the expected growth of net worth is negative and the risk is high.
Early Warning Signals of the Crisis
The financial crisis was precipitated by the mortgage crisis for several reasons. First, a whole structure of financial derivatives was based upon the ultimate debtors -the mortgagors. Insofar as the mortgagors were unable to service their debts, the values of the derivatives fell. Second, the financial intermediaries whose assets and liabilities were based upon the value of derivatives were very highly leveraged. Changes in the values of their net worth were large multiples of changes in asset values. Third, the financial intermediaries were closely linked -the assets of one group were liabilities of another -as described in sections 1.1 and 1.2. A cascade was precipitated by the mortgage defaults.
The "Quants"/financial engineers ignored these points. They have had very microscopic points of view and the unfounded belief that the probability distribution of recent price changes is time invariant. Moreover they ignored the fact that other "Quants"
were doing the same thing, based upon the same models. They did not consider that their collective behavior would affect the probability distribution. For these reasons, I
focus upon the excess debt of the mortgagors. The whole structure of derivatives rested upon the mortgagors being able to service their debts. Hence my basic question is: Did the debt ratio of the mortgagors significantly exceed f-max in figure 3? The application of the optimal dynamic risk management/SOC analysis is done in several steps. First, the bubble was generated by the market view that the trend of pricesthe capital gains -exceeded the rate of interest. Then I show how the collapse occurred when the capital gain fell below the rate of interest. Defaults and bankruptcies occurred.
Second, on the basis of the analysis in part 6, I derive estimates of the excess debt Ψ(t) = f(t) -f*(t) that lowered the expected return and raised risk. where β i is the regression coefficient of element X i whose change was dX i . Table 1 , the sketch of the sub-prime mortgage story in part 2 and the violation of the "no free lunch" constraint in equation (12) above explain how the excess debt Ψ(t) led to the crisis. The bubble started with an estimate of the price trend greater than the rate of interest. Risk was assumed to be low because of the high capital gains relative to the interest rate raised the value of the houses above the debt owed. An entire structure of financial instruments/derivatives was based upon these mortgages. The debt ratio was greater than f-max. The collapse occurred when the capital gains declined as shown in figure 2 and table 1.
Estimates of Excess Debt, Early Warning Signal of a Crisis
An Early Warning Signal of a debt crisis is a series of excessive debts Ψ(t) = f(t) -f*(t) > 0 . As shown in figure 3/eq. (19), the loss of growth from non-optimal debt ratios over a period (0,T) is
When the debt ratio f(t) exceeds f-max in figure 3 , the expected growth is negative and the risk is high. A crisis is likely when ∫ As explained in connection with figure 3 there will always be a specification error in estimating the optimal debt ratio. The main reason is that the price trend ρ cannot be known with certainty, but I require that it not exceed the rate of interest. Therefore a rather flexible approach will be taken to estimate the optimal debt ratio f*(t).
The optimum debt ratio f* is based upon eqn. (16), with the constraint that r = ρ -i > 0. From the histogram of the capital gains in figure 1 , the mean capital gain was 5.4%
per annum with a standard deviation of 2.9%. It is reasonable to argue that, over a long period, the real appreciation of housing prices was not significantly different from "the mortgage rate of interest", (i-ρ) = r = 0. The optimal debt ratio from (16) should be (16a)
below. The normalized optimal debt ratio is N(f*) in equation (21).
Τhe main term is [(β(t) -β)] the deviation of the return on capital from its mean value over the entire period. We must estimate β(t), the productivity of capital. The productivity of housing capital is the implicit net rental income/value of the home plus a convenience yield in owning one's home. Assume that the convenience yield in owning a home has been relatively constant. Approximate the return β(t) by using the ratio of rental income/disposable personal income. This ratio is not sensitive to the level of housing prices, whereas rents/value of housing is statistically negatively related to the level of housing prices. Therefore one can be confident that deviation y(t) from trend was positive and rising during this period.
Putting together the two components of the optimal debt ratio in equation (21) housing prices relative to disposable income and led to rises in the debt ratio. Figure 2 shows this relation clearly.
By 2005-06 the ratio of housing price/disposable income was about three standard deviations above the long-term mean. See PRICEINC in figure 2. This drastic rise alarmed several economists who believed that the housing market was drastically overvalued. As indicated in part 2 above, they were in a minority. It certainly had a negligible effect upon the market for derivatives and the optimism of the "Quants".
The advantages of using excess debt Ψ(t)in figure 5 as an Early Warning Signal compared to just the ratio of housing price/disposable income are that Ψ(t) focuses upon the fundamental determinants of the optimal debt ratio as well as upon the actual ratio.
The probability of declines in net worth and a crisis are directly related to the excess debt.
Moreover, the use of normalized variables indicates the magnitude of the excess debt in terms of standard deviations, and more meaningful estimates can be made of the probability of a crisis. The danger from "overvaluation" of housing prices is that the debt used to finance the purchase is excessive. Figure 6 graphs the ratio of housing prices/disposable income PRICEINC and the debt service DEBTSERVICE, which is interest payments/disposable income. They are significantly positively related. The SOC focuses upon the debt, which can cause a crisis. Second: how should one formulate and model the expected trend of asset prices to avoid bubbles and subsequent crashes? The major failing of the market was to anticipate a trend of housing prices that was based upon the probability distribution over the recent past. This was a period where the asset prices were growing at a rate greater than the rate of interest. Loans could only be serviced from the capital gains. This probability distribution was unsustainable. The SOC analysis constrains the trend of asset prices to be less than or equal to the rate of interest. Thereby a "no free lunch" constraint is imposed in the optimization.
Third: what are early warning signals of a crisis? The SOC analysis derives an "excess debt" defined as the difference between the actual and optimal debt ratio. The optimal ratio depends upon the productivity of capital less the real interest rate, the variance of the capital gain and the deviation of asset prices from a trend, which does not exceed the interest rate. The optimal debt ratio/ leverage is objectively measured.
As the debt ratio exceeds the optimal ratio, the expected growth of net worth declines and the risk rises. Since the probability of losses and bankruptcy is directly related to the excess debt, the excess debt is an early warning signal of a crisis.
Empirically, measures of actual, optimal and excess debt are expressed in normalized form, where the mean is zero and the standard deviation is unity. Probability measures can be associated with excess debt, and the probability of a crisis is more clearly defined. This theoretically derived approach is a more useful warning signal than is the arbitrary "stress testing".
There are several unresolved issues that are left for further research. First, given that the Federal Reserve may be concerned with asset market bubbles, how should its monetary policy be conducted? Second, what is an optimal system of regulation to avoid subsequent crises?
